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CHARACTERIZATION OF OPTIMA IN SMOOTH PARETO 
ECONOMIC SYSTEMS* 
Carl P. SIMON and Charles TITUS 
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich. 48103, U.S.A. 
Simple techniques of calculus and geometry are used to study and characterize the optima of 
pure exchange economies in which the utility functions are smooth but not necessarily convex. 
It is also shown how one can reduce the problem of optimizing p functions on the manifold of 
states to that of maximizing a single function on a submanifold of this space. Two models are 
described: one in which a person cannot trade to an optimum unless he starts at one; and one 
in which a person cannot even get near a local Pareto optimum along continuous ‘trade curves’ 
from most initial distributions. Finally, the set of optima is described for a generic set of utility 
mappings. 
1. Introduction 
In this paper, we use the tools of calculus and differential geometry to study 
various optima that arise naturally in a pure exchange economy. Our work has 
been motivated by the lectures and papers of Smale (1973a, b; 1974a, b, c, d) 
on Global Analysis and Economics. Not only do we attempt a very systematic 
treatment of the characterization of economic optima but we also supply com- 
plete proofs of some theorems which are only sketched in Smale’s papers. We 
also restrict ourselves to simple tools of differential calculus although the sketches 
in Smale (1973a, b) rely on recent advances in the theory of singularities of 
mappings. More importantly, we employ a simpler model for trading and study 
different optima than Smale does. Our trade curves are simply piecewise smooth 
curves in the state space on which no person’s utility function decreases and 
someone’s utility function is increasing. Beside the classical Pareto optima (PO), 
we study local Pareto optima (LPO) and ‘trade optima’ (TO) (states from which 
there is no trade curve) - all of which, we feel, are more closely related to the 
classical optima of economics. 
In section 2, we make precise our economic model and the axioms we will use. 
In section 3, we define our optima and our trade curves; in section 4, we give 
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necessary conditions for a state to be an optimum. In section 5, we use second 
derivative tests to give sufficient conditions. In section 6, we derive other 
sufficient conditions using more geometric techniques. Here, we show how to 
reduce the problem of optimizingp functions on a state space to that of maximiz- 
ing a single function on a submanifold of this state space (Theorems 7 and 10, 
and Corollary 2). 
In section 7, we describe what the set of optima looks like for a generic utility 
mapping (ul, . . . , up). Here, we use some elementary transversality and singu- 
larity theory for the first time. To emphasize that the techniques are indeed 
simple, we also provide short proofs of the basic theorems we use. In section 8, 
we discuss the problem of reaching a TO or LPO from a given initial distribu- 
tion of commodities. We describe a model where no one can reach a TO without 
starting at one, and also a model where from most initial distributions one 
cannot even get near an LPO by continuous trade curves. These models, in 
which the utility functions are smooth and monotone but not convex, illustrate 
the importance of convexity assumptions in the theorems of Smale (1974d) and 
others which under various assumptions show the accessibility of an equilibrium 
from any initial distribution of wealth. These models also lead naturally to 
questions concerning the generic properties of utility mappings. 
Besides the papers of Smale, we suggest Debreu (1959) and Intriligator (1958) 
as economic references and Abraham-Robbin (1967), Spivak (1965) and Golubit- 
sky-Guillemin (1974) as mathematical references. It is a pleasure to acknow- 
ledge the assistance of Dennis Barden in setting up of models, of Jean Martinet 
in demystifying and applying singularity theory, and of Don Brown in renewing 
our interest in economics. 
2. Pareto economic systems 
We first describe the structure of certain relatively abstract Pareto systems and 
next, some smooth models of this system which we study in some detail in the 
following sections. 
There are p 2 2 objects called persons and c 2 2 sets called commodities. Let 
R, be the positive real numbers and R, the non-negative real numbers. On each 
commodity there is a measure which assigns to each measurable subset of the 
commodity a non-negative real number called an amount of the commodity. A 
holding of the uthperson is a vector 
XX= (X;,...,XK,)ERC+, 
where x; is the amount of theith commodity held by the rcth person. A state of 
the system is a vector 
x = (xl, . . ., x”) E (n;y, 
which assigns a holding to each person. The state space is a collection of states. 
C.P. Simon and C. Titus, Optima in Pareto economic systems 299 
To each (rcth) person there is assigned an ordering on Sz, x > ’ y, which is transi- 
tive, reflexive and complete (complete means that, for every pair of states, x and 
y, either x >K y or y >” x); this ordering is called individual preference. States 
x and y such that x >K y and y >K x are called individually indifferent, x wK y. 
Finally, a Pareto system has the following additional structure. A new ordering 
on Q, x > y, called Pareto preference is defined by x > y o x >“ y for all 
rcandx wK y for some K; in words, a state x is Pareto prefered to a state y if x 
is individually prefered to y by all and if some are not individually indifferent to 
x and y. 
In order to use the techniques of calculus and geometry we will study only 
smooth mathematical models of Pareto systems; namely, we study Pareto 
systems which satisfy the following axioms [A, = (Al, A,,2, A,3, A4)]. 
(Al) The sum of the individual holdings of each commodity is a positive 
constant on 0. Formally, this means that there exists a vector a E R: so that 
52 = {x = (xl, . ..,x~)E(R~+)~Ix~+ . ..+~~=a}. 
The state space Sz c RCP is given the ordinary Euclidean topology, but the usual 
Euclidean metric on RcP has no intrinsic significance. 
(A,2) For each (Kth) person the individual preference on D is represented by 
a C”-smooth, n 2 1, utilityfunction, u, : D + R, so that 
x >“Y * %(X> B %c(Y). 
(Clearly, many different sets of utility functions can represent the same set of 
individual preferences.) 
(A,3) The individual preference of each person depends only on his own 
holding. Formally, with the projections rcK : Sz + R’+ defined by x = (x1, . . . , 
x”) w xK, there exist C”-smooth functions, U, : n,(Q) c R’+ -+ R, so that 
The Kth vertex of the system is the state x such that rc,Jx) = a; i.e., the state 
in which the rcth person holds all of every commodity. 
(A4) For each (rcth) person the utility function u, has no critical point on 0, 
except possibly at the lcth vertex. 
3. Trades and optima 
The primary goal of the rest of this paper is to define and characterize various 
optimal states in systems which statisfy the Axioms A,. 
A state x E D is a (Global) Pareto Optimum (PO) if there is no y E 52 such that 
y > x; i.e., such that u,(y) 2 u,(x) for all rc and u,(y) > u,(x) for some IC. 
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As usual in mathematics one treats a global optimization problem by first 
studying the local optima. Furthermore, if one assumes only that each person is 
‘aware’ of his individual preference for holdings ‘near’ his present holding, then 
local optima become the relevant economic optima. 
A state x E 51 is a Local Pareto Optimum, LPO, if there is a neighborhood N 
of x, so that there is no y E N with y > x. 
An allowable trade is a change from a state x to a state y, where y > x. In this 
way the definition of an LPO leads to the notion of sequences of ‘small’ allow- 
able trades; such sequences can be continued unless the last state is an LPO. So 
it is natural to study the dynamics of the system by introducing a continuous 
analogue of allowable trade sequences, 
In a system satisfying the Axioms A,, a (allowable) trade curve from the state 
x is a continuous piecewise C”-smooth mapping y : [0, E) + s2, E > 0, so that 
y(O) = x and y(s) < y(t) for all 0 5 s < t < E. 
Note that, although c(u, 0 y) is strictly a increasing function, its derivative 
may be zero on a totally disconnected set. On the other hand, the fact that 
1 (u, 0 y) is strictly increasing implies that y is one to one. 
A state x E 52 is a trade optimum, x E TO, if there is no trade curve from x. 
It follows immediately from the definitions that PO c LPO c TO. 
However, the converses are not true. To illustrate this, we construct s2 in the 
case p = c = 2. Here dim D = c(p- 1) = 2 and a is the classical Edgeworth 
Box. For simplicity assume a = (1, 1). (xi, xi) is the first consumer’s holding, 
while (xf , xi) = (1 -x: , 1 -xi) is the second consumer’s holding. So (xi, xi) 
give global coordinates on G!. In these coordinates, u1 = E r and 





Fig. 1. Edgeworth box, f2. 
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For an example of an LPO that is not a PO, let 
i-i,<x:, xi) = -x:. 
The level curves of u 1 in Q are horizontal. Let 
u,<x; , xi) = x: - 12(x:-3)3+(X:-+). 
It is simple to check that Y, = (5, &-) is an LPO but YZ = (-5, &) isapareto- 
preferred point [Ui( Y1) < Ui( YZ) for i = 1,2]. See fig. 2. 
Fig. 2. Y, is an LPO, but not a PO. 
Foian example of a TO that is not an LPO consider the model 
where 
u,(xi, xi) = -x:, 
44,x:> = x:-m-3), 
Fig. 3. Y is a TO, not an LPO. 
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Consider the point Y = (9, 4). Since u;~(zQ(Y)) crosses UT ‘(u,(Y)).inIinitely 
often on both sides of Y, there is no trade curve from Y, i.e., Y is a TO. On the 
other hand, Y is not an LPO since arbitrarily close to Y, (ir; l(uz( Y)) meets level 
lines of u1 above u; ‘(ul( Y)). 
4. First-order theory: Necessary conditions for optima 
The tangent space to 52 at x is, from Axiom Al, 
Ts2, = (V= (VI,..., ?‘)E(R=)PI Vi+ . . . +V’= O}. 
Note that the dimension of TSZ, is c(p- 1). For the derivative of kth utility 
function at X, we write Dz.+(x) : Ts2, + R. Call 
u = (ul,...,uP):i2-+RP 
the utility mapping. For its derivative we write Du(x) : T!& .+ RP. We denote the 
critical set of the utility mapping u by S,(U). So 
S,(u) = (X E G! 1 Rank Du(x) < Min. [p, c(p- l)] = p>. 
Since Sz and a$ both have non-empty boundaries, one must work carefully 
with the uk, and ii, on these boundaries. For example, we require that each i& 
be defined and C” on an open neighborhood of n,(Q) in R’. This will ensure that 
u, = Ek 0 flk and u are defined and C” on an open c(p - 1)-dimensional manifold 
containing 52. For x E XI, we will take TSZ, to be the above c(p- 1)-dimensional 
space instead of T(as2), . 
Theorem I. Let u : t2 + Rp be a utility mapping of a Pareto system satisfying 
Axioms A,, . Then, the following statements are equivalent when x is not a vertex: 
(1) x E S,(u). 
(2) Rank Du(x) = p- 1. 
(3) There exist Al, . . . , 1, E R with no li zero and 
~ nj DUj(X) = 0. 
j=l 
(4) There exist Al, . . . 1, E R with no iii zero and 
4 J%c(xk> = ,I,DiZ,(xp), k = 1,2,. . .,p-1. 
Proof. We prove (1) * (4) * (3) =E- (2) =E- (1). For (1) => (4), since x E S,(u), 
there exist Ll, . . . , 1, in R, not all zero, such that 
C 5 DUj(X)V = 0, . 
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for all V E TSZ, . Since Uj = Cj 0 ~j, 
for all (V’, . . ., VP) E (Rc)p such that 
c vi = 0. 
SO, 
I$; lj DCj(xi)Vi+I, Dii,(xP)f- V1- . . . - VP- ‘1 = 0, 
forall V’, . . ., VP- ’ in RC. But this implies that 
lj Duj(xj) = 1, Di&(xP) for j = 1, . . . , p. 
Since no DUI, is zero and some 1, is not zero, it follows that no & is zero and (4) 
is proved. This argument also shows that (3) and (4) are equivalent since the Aj 
in either statement serve as the lj in the other statement. But (4) implies that the 
ratios Aj/l, are uniquely determined, which means that the corank of Du(x) is 
equal to one; and so (2) follows. That (2) * (1) is trivial and the proof is com- 
plete. 
Remark. Theorem 1 tells us that axioms A,3 and A4 imply the following 
condition which we will call Axiom A3’ : the rank of Da(x) is greater or equal to 
p - 1 for all x in 52. We will denote the (weaker) set of Axioms Al, A,2, A3’, and 
A4byA;. 
Define 0 = e(u) c S,(u) to be the set of singular points x of u with the 
property that all of the Aj in the linear combination c nj Duj(x) = 0 have the 
same sign. The following characterizations of 8 are essentially due to Smale 
(1973b, 1974b). 
Theorem 2. Let u : l2 + Rp be a utility mapping for a Pareto system satisfying 
the Axioms AA. Let x E interior of a. Then, the following statements are equiva- 
lent: 
(1) XE0. 
(2) The image of Du(x) does not meet RP, . 
(3) There is no trade curve y from x such that 
(u, o y)‘(O) = Dz+(x)y’(O) > 0 for allk. 
(4) There is no V E Ts2, such that Dz+(x) V > 0 for all k. 
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Proof. (1) implies (4) since for x E 8 there exist A,, . . . ,A, all positive with 
C ~j DUj(X) = 0. But if DUj(x)V > 0 for all j, then C lj Duj(X)V would be 
positive and thus non-zero. (4) is equivalent to (3) by identifying V in (4) with 
y’(O) in (3). (2) is a restatement of (4). To see that (4) implies (l), note first that 
(4) implies x is in S,(u) since Du(x) is not onto. Suppose c lj Duj(x) = 0 and 
II > 0. Choose k =I= 1. Without loss of generality, take k to be p. Now there 
isavectorw = (WI,. . ., wp_ 1) in RP- ’ with w1 > 0 for all i and 
Since D(u, , . . . , up_ &(x) : Tsl, -+ Rp- 1 is surjective (by Axiom A3’), there is a 
Pin T&with (Du,(x)V, . . . , Dz+ l(x)V) = w. Now 
‘pDup(x)‘= - C ~j Duj(x)V= -CnjWj < 0. 
i<p 
Since each wj > 0, (4) implies Du,(x) V I 0. Therefore, A, > 0. 
Remark. We have preferred to use the differentials of utility functions 
instead of their gradients since the existence of the gradient depends on the 
choice of a Riemannian metric on Q and therefore gradient vectors have no 
intrinsic significance in studying Pareto systems as we have defined them. The 
only intrinsically significant things that we defined by a utility function are its 
level (indifference) surfaces and which side of a given level surface is Pareto 
preferable to the surface. Nevertheless, the gradient vector grad ui(x) is some- 
times helpful in interpreting definitions and theorems pictorially. For example, 
since 
( grad Ui(X), V ) = Dui(X) V, 
where ( . , . ) is the inner product of the metric being used, statement (4) in 
Theorem 2 is equivalent to the statement that for any choice of Riemannian 
metric on Q, the set of gradients {grad uJx))p= 1 do not lie in any open half space. 
Remark. Smale (1973a, b) defines an admissible curve to be a trade curve y 
such that Dz&)$(O) > 0 for all k, as in (3) of Theorem 2. He uses only such 
curves to describe trades in his model. 
The principal interest in 6’ comes from the fact that any optimum (PO, LPO, 
TO) in the interior of Q must lie on 8. This follows from the contrapositive of 
(3) =z- (1) in Theorem 2 and the fact that PO c LPO c TO. 
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Corollary 1. If x lies in a (the interior of s2) and x is a PO, LPO, or TO for a 
Pareto system satisfying Axioms AA (n 2 l), then x E 0. 
In what follows, we’ll make frequent use of the following corollary of the 
implicit function theorem [e.g., Golubitsky-Guillemin (1974), Spivak (1965)]. 
Suppose n 2 q and g : M” -+ R4 is a C’ mapping with the rank of Dg(x) : TM, + 
R4 equal to q. Then, there is a neighborhood Nof x in M” such that N n g- ‘(g(x)) 
is a smooth submanifold of M of codimension q (i.e., of dimension n -4). 
The following definition isolates one of the principal ideas in all that follows. 
Let U:k’ be the intersection of all but the kth level surface through x, 
up = fi #j- l(Uj(X)). 
j=l 
j9k 
Theorem 3. Let u = (ul, . . . , up) be the utility mapping for a Pareto system 
satisfying the Axioms AA. Then : 
0) Ifx 4 S,(N, 
K ui 't"jCx>) j=l 
is a smooth codimension p submantfold of 52 near x. 
(2) If x is in the interior of 52, each U:kj is a codimension p- 1 submantfold of Q. 
(3) x E sl(u) * uk 1 ux ck) has a critical point at x for all k; o uk 1 Uik’ has a 
criticalpoint at xfor some k. 
Proof (1) and (2) follow immediately from the above corollary to the 
implicit function theorem. For (l), D(u, , . . . , up) (x) : TQX -+ Rp has rank p if 
x $ S,(u). For (2), D(u,, . . ., u,_ 1, uk+ 1, . . ., up) (x) : TSZ, + Rp-’ has rank 
p - 1 for all x E fi by Axioms A3’ and A4. To see (3), suppose y is a critical point 
Of u, 1 UC’, i.e., DU,(J’) 1 (TUik’),, 
Duj(y) 1 (TGk’), 
is 0. Since the other Uj’s are constant on Uik’, 
is zero for all j. Since u = (ul , . . . , up), the kernel of Dub) 
contains a space of codimension p - 1 and thus Du(y) is not of full rank at y. So, 
y E S,(u). On the other hand, for y E S,(u) there are I,, . . . , A, all non-zero with 
C lj DUjb) = 0. For any k, 
As before, Duj(y) I (TUik)), is zero for allj =l= k. Therefore, DukQ ] (TUik’), is 
0 and y is a critical point of each u, I Uik’. 
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Remark. The above argument shows that for all k, 
(TUL’)), = ker Du(X) for all x E int Sz. 
5. Characterization of LPO and TO in 8: Calculus techniques 
In section 4, we saw that in order for a point Yin fi to be an optimum, Y must 
lie in 8. In this section, we discuss some sufficient conditions to determine which 
elements of 6J are economic optima. As Smale (1973a, b; 1974b) does, we use the 
‘second intrinsic derivative’ of our utility mapping for the optima which we are 
studying. However, we will use no singularity theory, only techniques of elemen- 
tary calculus, and will write out the complete proofs. 
Definition. Let u be a utility mapping satisfying the axioms A,, or AA. Let 
X E e(u). So, there are I,, . . . , I, all positive with 
$ Ai DUi(X) = 0. 
Without loss of generality, we will always assume A 1 = 1 and so &, . . . ,& are 
uniquely determined. Let K, denote the kernel of Du(x) : TL-2, + Rp. So, K, lies 
in Ts2, and is equal to 
ifi ker {DuJx) : TSZ, + R} . 
Let Fz be the symmetric bilinear form 
,~~ ;liD’ui(X): K,XK,-, R, 
where D’ui(X) is the second-order differential of ur at x. Fz, with domain K,, 
is related to what Porteous (1970) and Smale (1973a, b) call the second intrinsic 
derivative of u. Our first proposition states that FE is indeed intrinsic. 
Proposition 1. For x E e(u), where u is a C2 utility mapping G? + Rp satisfying 
the Axioms A;, F: is independent of the coordinate system used around x. More 
precisely, ifr(t) is any smooth curve in Sz with y(O) = x and y’(O) = v E K,, then 
F:(v, v) = 
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Proof. 
$ ui(Y(t)> = d MY(t)> I Y’(t) t=o t=o 
+ Dui(Y(t>) 
t=o 
= D2uMO))(y’(O>~ ~‘(0)) + DukY(O)(Y”(O)) 
= D’Ui(x)(v, U) + Dui(X)y”(O) 3 
The first term is F~(u, a), and the second term is zero since c li Dui(x) = 0. 
To compute F~(v, w), use the polarization formula 
F,2(?& w) = $[‘,2(u+w, v+w)-F:(zJ, u)-F,(w, w)]. 
Dejinition. x E DGN if and only if x E f?(u) and F,’ : K, x K, -+ R is a de- 
generate bilinear form; that is, for some non-zero u in K,, Fz(v, w) = 0 for all w 
in K,. In the language of singularity theory [see Levine (1970)] such an x is in 
W’(u)). 
Before discussing sufficient conditions for optima, we first strengthen our 
necessary condition. 
Theorem 4. Suppose u is a utility mapping satisfying the Axioms A;. Suppose 
x is in d and in 0(u)\ DGN. If x is a TO, LPO, or PO, then F,’ is negative definite 
on K,. 
ProoJ If F,’ is non-degenerate but not negative definite on K, there is a non- 
zero v in K, with c Aj D’uj(x)(U, u) > 0. Since the lj are all positive, there is 
some k with D’u,(x)(u, U) > 0. Since x E 0, 
DUE = C p DUi(X). 
i+k k 
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K, = 0 ker DZQ(X) = n DUB = (ZV$)),. 
j .i+k 
We have x a critical point of u, 1 U, . ck) * Utk) -+ R with t, E (TU$k)),, such that x 
D2(Uk 1 ULk))(x)(~, u) # 0. Therefore, there is a smooth curve y(t) on Uik’ with 
y(O) = x, y’(O) = U, and t H u&(t)) strictly increasing for small t. So, y is a trade 
curve and x is not a TO. 1 
Recall that y : [O, E] --, 52 is a trade curve if y is a continuous, piecewise smooth 
curve with each t I-+ ui(y(t)) non-decreasing and t + Ci ui(y(t)) strictly increas- 
ing. If, in addition, y is C’ for t = 0 and y’(0) =I= 0, we will call y a directed trade 
curve. Such curves are more amenable to calculus techniques. If there is no 
directed trade curve from x, we say x is a TO+. Clearly, LPO * TO * TO+. 
In the last section, we’ll give an example of a point that is a TO+ but not a TO. 
Note that TO o TO+ for c = p = 2. Our use of directed trade curves is only 
temporary for in the next section we’ll derive properties for LPO and TO’s that 
are derived here for TO+‘s : The next theorem is the goal of this section. 
Theorem 5. Suppose u : 52 + Rp is a utility mapping satisfying the Axioms A;. 
Suppose x is in d and in B(u)\DGN. Then, x is a TO’ if and only if I;,” : K, x 
K, + R is negative definite. 
Proof. Suppose that F,’ is negative definite but x is not a TO+. Let y(t) be a 
directed trade curve with y(O) = x and y’(0) = Y. So, Du,(x)v 2 0 for all i. If 
v4K,, 
C;liDui(x) > 0, 
contradicting 
T li Dui(x) = 0. 
So, v E K,. Expand u,(y(t)) in its Taylor series about t = 0, 
ui(Y(t))-ui(Y(o)) = t $ ui(Y(t)) 
I 
+ g $Ui(Y(t)) + s * a 
t=o I t=o 
= tDU,(X)v+ p [DUi(x)W+D2Ui(X)(v, u)]+ . . ., 
where y”(O) = w. Since y(t) is a trade curve and 0 E K,, 
0 s ui(Y(t)>-ui(Y(o)) = t 
t 
5 [DU,(X)W+D2ui(x)(U, u)]+ . . +. 
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Therefore, Dui(x)w+D2ui(x)(~, a) 2 0 for all i. Since &‘s are positive and 
x E 8, 
0 5 7 1, DUi(X)W+ C li D”Ui(X)(~s v)
= F,(u, 0). 
But o non-zero contradicts the negative definiteness of F," . So, x is a TO+. 
So except for states in DGN, we have an excellent analytical characterization 
of the economic optima in the interior of Q. It now becomes important to study 
and characterize DGN, at least for generic utility mappings. This task will be 
carried out in section 7, where we indicate, among other things, that for an open 
and dense set of u’s, 19(u) is a (p- 1)-dimensional submanifold of 52, and DGN 
sits in 8 as a finite union of lower dimensional submanifolds. For p = 2, DGN 
is generically a finite set of states none of which are economic optima. 
We conclude this section with a more geometric characterization of e\DGN. 
By Theorem 2, if x q! 8 and x E fi, there is a straight line (or ‘first-order’) trade 
curve from x, i.e., y(t) = x+ IV for small t. Theorem 6 below states that if x is in 
8 but is not in DGN and is not a TO+, then there is a ‘second-order’ trade curve 
from x, i.e., a curve of the form y(t) = x+tv+(t2/2‘lw. Presumably, if x is in 
DGN and DGN is a submanifold around x and x is not a critical point of 
u 1 DGN, then if there is a trade curve from x, there is a third-order trade 
curve; and so on. 
Theorem 6. Let u be a utility mapping satisfying the Axioms A,. Suppose x 
is in 0 but not in DGN. Then, there is a directed trade curve from x if and only if 
there is a curve of the form y(t) = x+ tv+ (t2/2)w, for small t andfor some v and 
winTC&. 
Proof. If x 6 8, we can take w = 0 by Theorem 2. Suppose then that x is in 
e(u). Let y(t) be a directed trade curve with y(O) = x and y’(O) = u = (ul, . . . , 
VJ E (Rc)p with C ZJ~ = 0. The Ui(y(t)) non-decreasing implies that Dui(x)u 2 0 
for all i. If 
v $ K, = h ker DUi(X), 
i=l 
some Dui(x)u > 0. Since each ker Duj(x) is codimension one in T&, one can 
perturb u to a’ in TO, with Duj(x)u’ > 0 for all j. For small t, y(t) = x+ tv’ will 
be directed trade curve from x. 
If y’(0) = a is in K, say y(t) = x+ tv+ (t2/2)w+ . . . . As in the proof of 
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Theorem 5, one finds 
Dui(x)w+D2ui(x)(u, V) 2 0 for all i, 
and 
F,(u, u) = 1 Ai D2u,(x)(u, a) r 0. 
Since x 4 DGN, there is a v’ in K, arbitrarily close to 0 with F~(zJ’, 0’) > 0. 
Now 
where ui = Ei 0 ni, x = (xl,. . ., x3, and w = (wl,. . ., w,). Choose w’ = 
(w;, * * *, w;) with Cj W; = 0 and 
DUi(X)W’+D2Ui(X)(V’, u’) = D~i(X’)W’i+ D’Ui(X)(V’, u’) 
=O for i=2,...,p. 
Then, 
Du,(x)w’+D2u,(x)(v’, 0’) = t;rz(u’, v’) > 0. 
Finally, choose W” = (wl;, . . ., wi) with ‘& w; = 0, 
DUi(X)W’+D2Ui(X)(U’, u’) > 0 for i = 2, . . . , p, 
and w” so close to w’ that Du,(x)w”+D2u,(x)(u’, u’) is still > 0. Now, let 
y”(t) = x + tu’ + (t2/2)w”. y(t) is a second-order directed trade-curve through x. g 
6. Characterizations of LPO and TO in 8: Geometric techniques 
In this section, we’ll use some elementary geometry to improve the character- 
ization of section 5. We’ll rely on the properties described at the end of section 4, 
i.e., that the level surfaces of each Ui give a smooth codimension one partition 
or fokution of 0, that on 8 any p - 1 of the level surfaces always meet trans- 
versally, while off 8 allp of them meet transversally. All the results of this section 
are true under the weaker Axioms AA, i.e., no grad Ui(X) is ever zero and the 
rankofD(u,, . . ., u,)(x) is always greater than or equal top - 1. 
The following lemma will be useful in this section. It enables us to replace the 
weak inequalities in the definition of PO and LPO by strong inequalities. 
Lemma I. x E 52 is a PO if and only ifthere is no y in Q with ui(y) > ui(x) for 
all i; x is an LPO if and only iffor some neighborhood W of x there is no y in W 
with u,(y) > ui(x) for all i. 
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Proof. If x is not a PO there is a z in Q with ui(z) 2 ui(x) for all i and uk(z) > 
uk(x) for some k. Since u; l(ul(z)) is a codimension one submanifold of 52, we 
can find z’s u,(z’) > ul(z) 2 ul(x) with z’ still in the open set UP ‘(z+(x), co) 
and Ui(Z’) 2 ui(x) for i + 1, k. Keep working one subindex at a time until a y is 
found with u,(y) > ui(x) for all i. A similar argument works for LPO’s with z’, 
y, etc. in W. 1 
Since we’ll be changing coordinate systems shortly, we will need to keep in 
mind the following lemma. We omit a formal proof since it follows directly from 
Theorems 1 and 2 and is a consequence of the fact that S1 and 8 can be defined 
solely in terms of the level surfaces of the ui and their positive and negative sides. 
Lemma 2. S,(u) and 8 are independent of the choice of coordinate system or 
metric used on Q. 
Now, fix x E 8. Grad u,(x), . . . , grad up_ 1(x) are linearly independent vectors 
in TSZ, throughout 52. So, we can use ul, . . . , up_ I as part of a coordinate system 
about x. Choose coordinates yr , yz , . . . , y,(,- 1j in a nbhd. Vabout x, so that 
YiCx) = O for all i, 
yi = Ui_Ui(X) fori= 1,2 ,..., p-l. 
For i < P, Ui(Yr 9 . . ., yco,_ r)) = yi and Du,(y) = projection of the ith factor 
for all y E V. Consequently, D’u,(y) = 0 for all i < p and for all y E W. Note 
that D’Ui(y) can be represented by the symmetric matrix 
a%, 
(( >> ayjavk - 
so, 
F,’ = f pi D2ui(x) = pp D2u,(x) 
i=l 
in these coordinates, where p 1 , . . . , pp are positive. These are bilinear maps on 
K, x K, , where 
p--l 
K, = n ker Dui(X) 
i=l 
can be viewed as the space y1 = 0, . . . , yp_ 1 = 0. The space K, is also T,Uz’ 
for each i. Since we could have used any ui for up in this paragraph, the following 
proposition follows : 
Proposition 2. Let x E 8 n 0. So there exist 1 1, . . . ,A, positive, such that 
$&Dui(x) = 0. 
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(1) The index of the bilinear form 
F~ =C~~D’U~(X):K,XK,~R 
is the same as the index of x as the critical point of each u, 1 U$k’. 
(2) In particular, Fz is negative definite on K, if and only if x is a non- 
degenerate maximum for each of the functions u, 1 Uik’ : ULk’ + R, k = 1,2, 
. . .,p. 
To tie all this information in with our characterizations of TO’s and LPO’s, 
we will need the following lemma. Its proof follows very simply from standard 
techniques in the study of simplices and simplicial complexes and will be 
omitted. 
Lemma 3. Let U be a neighborhood of 0 in R" and let f : U --, R be a smooth 
function with 
(a) 0 a regular value; 
(b) f- ‘(0) meeting each Xi = 0 transversally in U; 
(c) gradf(x)*(a/axJ I a < 0 for all x Ef- ‘(0) n U and for all i. 
[So the normal to f - ‘(0) always points into the negative orthant.] Then, (1) if 
0 E f - ‘(O), near 0, f - ‘(0) divides each orthant of R” into 2 components except 
the positive and negative orthants, both of which it misses (fig. 4). 
Fig. 4 
(2) If 0 4 f - l(O), the hypersurfaces f = 0, x1 = 0,. . . , x, = 0 divide some 
neighborhood Y of 0 into 2” - 1 regions with all but one of the regions meeting 
the boundary of V and the remaining region, lying in the interior of V and in 
either the positive or negative orthant of R", diffeomorphic to a standard simplex. 
The union of the intersections of any k of the sets {f = 0) , . . . , {x, = 0) make 
up the n-k skeleton (fig. 5). 
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We can now give a characterization of LPO’s - including even those that lie 
in DGN. 
Theorem 7. For x E 8, the following are equivalent: 
(1) x is an LPO. 
(2) x E 8 and x is a weak local max. for every u, 1 Uzk’. 
(3) x E 0 and x is a weak local max. for some u, 1 Vi”‘. 
Proof. (1) * (2) If x is an LPO, x E 0 by Corollary 1. If jk3 ?.& 1 Uik’ does 
not have a weak local max. at x, then 3y arbitrarily close to x on Uik’ with 
uk(y) > uk(x). y E Ui”’ implies u,(y) = ui(x) for i * k. So, x $ LPO. 
(2) * (3) Trivially. 
(3) * (1) Without loss of generality, take p = k in (3). Vu,, . . . , Vup- I are 
independent throughout 8. On a nbhd. N of x, choose coordinates yi , yz , . . . , 
yco,- ,), so that yi = Ui-Ui(X) for i = 1,2, . . .,p- 1, as we did in proving 
Proposition 2. 
Choose a Riemannian metric m on N so that alay,, . , . , a/ayco,- 1j are ortho- 
normal on N. So, 
grad,,, u1 = a/ayl, . . ., grad,,, up_. 1 = a/ay,_, 
throughout N. Since 0 is independent of choice of metric by Lemma 2 and since 
x E 8 there exist r 1 , . . . , rp_ 1 all positive, so that 
(+I 
g-1 
grad, U&C) = - C ri grad,,, Ui(x). 
i=l 




Yp+1 = constant, 
yc(P-1) = constant. 
Now, grad,,, Ui(X) lies along P, for i = 1, . . . , p with grad, Ui(X) along the yi- 
axis for i < p. 
Using (+), we find that 
(grad, U,(X), grad,,, Ui(X)>, < 0 for all i < p, 
i.e., grad,,, u,(x) points into the negative orthant of P,. 
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the projection of grad,,, U,(Z) on P, points into the open negative orthant of 
P. 
& up x ( )) meets P, and aP, transversally with up ‘(U,(X)) n P, a connected 
submanifold of codimension one in P, separating P, into exactly two com- 
ponents (up > U,(X) and up < U&X)) and meeting each yi = 0 in P, trans- 
versallyfori = 1,. . .,p-1; 
if z E Uik) n N, uk(z) I y(x) fork = 1, . . . , p. 
Forj I p, define Pi = P, n ‘UT ‘(u,(x)). $0 
P!={Y/Yj=O}nP, for jlp-1. 
The following two claims follow from Lemma 3 with f = up and Xi = yi. 
Claim 1. If P,P contains the origin of P,, then P,” divides every orthant of P, 
but the positive and negative orthants. So, P, is divided into 2p- 2 regions each 
of which meets aP, (fig. 4 above). 
Claim 2. If P,” does not contain the origin of P,, then P, is divided into 2p - 1 
regions with exactly one region not meeting aP,. This exceptional region is 
diffeomorphic to a standard (p - 1)-simplex whose (p - 2) skeleton is composed 
of pieces of the P$ and each of whose p vertices is an intersection of (p- 1) 
Pts, i.e., an element of some U:k’. 
By Lemma 1, we need only show that 
,fil u- l(q(x), co) n y = 4 for x to be an LPO. 
Suppose this intersection contains some z. Look at P, . 
Case 1. If P,” contains the origin of P, , then 
p-1 
ne z (“i(x), a) n P 
i=l 
is the open positive orthant of P, while P,” does not meet this orthant and grad,,, up 
points into the negative orthant at the origin. Thus, 
[ 
p-1 
n u;l 64x), a) n P, n I$ ‘<upW, 00) n P,I = 4. 
I=1 1 
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Case 2. If P,’ does not contain the origin of P,, the only region that can 
correspond to 
in P, is the (p - I)-simplex of Claim 2. 
The origin w of P, corresponds to U$” n P,, as in fig. 6. Since w 4 Pi, u,(w) + 
up(x). 
Since up 1 U$” has a weak local max. at X, then u,(w) < z+,(x). 
Fig. 6. Pz for p = 3. 
This simplex lies on the negative side of up ‘(u,(x)) so 
ifJl G ‘C”i(X), a) f-3 P, = 4, 
and x is an LPO. Q.E.D. 
We can drop the condition that x E 8. 
Theorem 8. Let x E fi. Suppose that for each k, u, 1 Uik’ has a weak local 
max. at x; andfor some k, uk \ Uik’ is not locally constant at x. Then x E LPO. 
Proof. If x E 8, this follows from Theorem 7. The fact that x is a critical point 
for some uk 1 uik’ insures that x E S,(u). If x E S,(u)\e, grad, up(x) would not 
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point into the closed negative orthant in P, in the above proof. Then, either 
grad,,, u,(x) points into the open positive orthant of P, or P,” divides the positive 
orthant of P, into 2 regions. 
Choose p so that up 1 U$*) is not locally constant at x. So 
3z E Vi*) with u,(z) < u,(x). 
P,” does not contain the origin z of P, and a simplex appears in P, as before 
(figs. 5 and 6). [Note that Lemma 3 holds as long as gradf(x) points into the 
same open orthant for all x E f - l(O).] 
If the simplex lies in the negative orthant, then grad, u,(x) points into the 
positive orthant and u,(z) > u,(x), a contradiction. 
If the simplex lies in some other orthant, there is a vertex w’ not in the closure 
of the negative orthant; and for some k w’ E Ui”) with &(w’) > &(x), a contra- 
diction. x E 8 and the theorem follows. i 
As a final geometric characterization of optima, we have the following: 
Theorem 9. Suppose x E ti and x 6 S, \ 8. Then, if there is a trade curve from 
y from x, there is a trade curve on every Uik’. 
Corollary 2. Suppose x E d and x $ S,\ 6. Then, x is a TO I~X is a TO for 
each u, 1 ui? 
Proof of Theorem. If x # S1 , U!“’ is transverse to u; l(uk(x))Vk. Thus, for 
each k, there is a smooth curve onUik) on which uk is strictly increasing, i.e., a 
trade curve. 
Suppose x E e. 
Construct coordinate system y 1 , . . . , yctp- r), metric m, and submanifolds P, 
as in the above theorems. Let y : [0, E] + 52 be a trade curve with y(O) = x. For 
each t, y(t) lies in the simplex 
ii %’ l[“i(x), co) 
i=l 
in pyct) which lies in the positive orthant. For each k, one can take the new 
curve bk : [0, E] + Sz, where 
a,(t) E up n Pytt) vt, 
i.e., 
uk(t) = fi p;,t)* 
j+k 
uk will be a trade curve from x. 1 
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Remark. Forp = 2, we could easily have 
(1) x E S1\& 
(2) u; l(ul(x)) n N = U; l(u2(x)) n N for some neighborhood N of x. 
Fig. 7 
Then, x is not a TO or LPO, but there is no trade curve on U; ‘(ur(x)) since u1 
and u2 are constant there near x. 
Finally, for x not in DGN the following proposition summarizes some of the 
results of the last two sections. For the optima that may lie in DGN, Theorems 
7 and 8, and Corollary 2 apply. 
Theorem 10. Suppose x E b and x is O\ DGN. Suppose u satisfies the Axioms 
A 2 or A’, . Then, the following are equivalent. 
(1) F,” : K, x K, + R is negative de$nite. 
(2) Each D2(uk ( Uik’) : TXUik’ x TXUik’ --+ R is negative definite. 
(3) x is a non-degenerate local maximum for each 
u,IU$~‘:U:~‘_,R, k= l,..., p. 
(4) x is an LPO. 
(5) x is a TO. 
(6) x is a TO+. 
7. Generic properties of utility mappings 
In this section, we will use some of the simpler tools of transversality theory 
and singularity theory to describe how S’(u), 0(u), and DGN sit in Q for generic 
utility mappings u : !2 --f Rp satisfying Axioms A2 or A;. For some excellent 
survey articles on singularities and transversality, see Wall (1970) [especially, 
Levine (1970)] and Golubitsky-Guillemin (1974). Nearly all of this chapter is a 
result of conversations and correspondence with Jean Martinet, to whom we 
express our deep gratitude. 
The main result of this section is that 0(u) is generically a (p - I)-dimensional 
318 C.P. Simon and C. Titus, Optima in Pareto ecorwrnic systems 
submanifold of D and that DGN sits in e(u) as a union of lower-dimensional 
algebraic sets. Smale (1974b) sketches a proof of the first statement and Wan 
(1973) handles DGN for p = 2. We have included this chapter not only for the 
sake of completeness but also to attempt to demystify the use of transversality 
techniques in economics. We include a simple, but complete, two paragraph 
proof of Thorn’s transversality theorem for finite-dimensional spaces of mappings 
and then we indicate how one can use finite-dimensional function spaces instead 
of infinite-dimensional ones to show generic properties of mappings and jets. 
Letf, g : Q -+ Rp be smooth (Cm) maps with x E Sz and r 2 0 an integer. This 
means, of course, that f and g are defined and are C” on some open neighbor- 
hood of Q in 
I@‘- I) = ((xl, . . . , x”) E Rep ) 1 xi = u> .
Write f N r g at x iff(x) = g(x) and all partial derivatives of order 5 r off and 
of g agree at x. The partials are calculated with respect to some choice of local 
coordinates about x in B and aboutf(x) in RP. So, f N r g at x if and only if the 
Taylor expansions off and of g about x coincide up to and including the rth 
order terms. Such an equivalence class is called an r-jet at (x, f(x)) of maps 
52 + Rp. 
If we use local coordinates at source and target, together with the partial 
derivatives listed above, to give charts, we can consider the space of all r-jets 
i2 + RP as a smooth manifold and we denote it byJ’(S2, Rp). Ifwe have a smooth 
map f: Cl + Rp and an x in Sz, the equivalence class off at x in J’(sZ, Rp), written 
j’f(x), is an r-jet with source x. Letting x vary over Q defines a smooth map (or 
‘section’)j’f: Sz + J’(Q, RP), called the r-jet off. 
We use r-jets to give a convenient topology to C’(Q, Rp). For r < co, we give 
Cr(Q, Rp) the topology for which the following is a base of open subsets: 
{f: i-2 + Rp Ij’f(i2) c U> for all open sets U in J’(Q, Rp). Since Sz is compact, 
convergence in this topology is equivalent to uniform convergence off with all its 
derivatives of order < r. The C” topology on C”O(sZ, Rp) is defined by taking the 
above for all r as a base of open subsets. 
Suppose g : i2 -P N is a smooth map of smooth manifolds and I; is a smooth 
submanifold of N. The map g is trunsverse to I; if whenever g(x) E Z, 
i.e., the image of Q by g around g(x) fills up a space complementary to X in N. 
It is a straightforward consequence of the implicit function theorem [e.g., 
Abraham (1967), Golubitsky-Guillemin (1974)] that when g is transverse to Z, 
g-‘(Z) (if non-empty) is a submanifold of Q whose dimension is equal to dim 
O+ dim Z - dim N. 
To illustrate the last paragraph, let us see what it states for linear maps. If E 
and Fare finite-dimensional vector spaces, C is a subspace of F, and A : E -+ F 
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is a linear map, then A is transverse to 1 if A(E) + .Z = F. Let G be a subspace 
of F with Z @ G = F and let 7~ denote the projection of F onto G. ‘A transverse 
to Z:’ is equivalent to n o A : E -+ G being surjective. In this case, by a simple 
theorem of linear algebra, codimension of Z in F = dim G = dim range (z o A) 
= dim domain (7~ 0 A) -dim kernel (X 0 A) = dim E-dim A-‘(Z) = codim 
A- ‘Z in E. On manifolds, g : A2 + N is transverse to Z if whenever g(x) E Z, 
Dg(x) : TQ, --, TNgcxj is transverse to T&,) as a linear map of linear spaces. 
The following theorems of Thorn are the central theorems of singularity and 
transversality theory. The proofs we use are basically Thorn’s original ones but 
seem much simpler than some more recent proofs [e.g., Abraham (1967)] 
because they use a finite-dimensional function space instead of the whole in- 
finite-dimensional one. 
Theorem 11 (Thorn). Let M, P, and N be finite-dimensional manifolds with S 
a closed submanifold of N and M compact. Let F: M x P + N be a C” map with 
F transverse to S (F 16 S). Then, for an open, dense of p E P, tk rra~ Fp : M + N 
by I;,(x) = F(x, p) is transverse to S. 
[So, P is considered as a parameter space of maps from M to N.] 
Proof. Openness follows easily from the fact that S is closed, M is compact, 
and transversal intersection is locally an open property. 
To achieve the density, let L = I;- ‘(S), a submanifold of M x P since F ,-h S. 
Let II : M x P + P be the projection and let it : L + P be x 1 L. By Sard’s theorem 
[Spivak (1965), Abraham (1967)], the regular values of it are dense in P. So, we 








Let x E M be such that F,(x) E S and p is a regular value of K By the latter 
condition, DE(x, p) = it : TLC._) + TpP is surjective. Since 
TW x P),,,,, z T(Mx {P>),,,,, @ TW x P)(xepj 3 
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this means that 
Since DF(x, p) is linear and F Ih S, 
contains a complement to TSFp(,) in TNp,(,, . Since 
this means that 
DHx, P)CTWX {p>>(x.p,l = DF,W[TM,I 
contains a complement to TSFpcX) in TNFp(,.., i.e., that Fp is transverse to S. 
Q.E.D. 
The Thorn Jet Transversality Theorem follows easily from this simple trans- 
versality theorem. 
Theorem 12 (Thorn). Consider Cm(M) Rp) with the C” ‘-topology. Let Z be 
any closed submanifold of J’(M, Rp). The set of mappings f in Cm(M, Rp) such that 
j’cf, : M + J’(M, Rp) is transverse to I; is open anddense in C”‘(M, Rp). 
Proof. Let f E Cm(M) R”). Embed M in R”‘. Let 9, be the finite-dimensional 
vector space of all polynomial mappings R” --, Rp of degree s r. Define 
F: MxB, --t RPby 
F(x, P) = f(x) + P(x). 
DefineE‘ = j:F: MxB, --, J’(M, Rp) by P(x, P) as the Taylor series at x (up to 
and including terms of order r) off + P 1 M. Since TJ”(M, R”)j,fcx, can be viewed 
as 
F is easily seen to be a submersion, i.e., its derivative is onto at each point. So I? 
is transverse to any submanifold of J’(M, Rp). Now, use the previous theorem 
to see that one can perturb f to g such that y(g) A Z and that the set of all 
such g’s is open in C”(M, Rp). Q.E.D. 
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Now, let us try to state generic properties of S’(U) and S@‘(u)) for utility 
mappings u by using Theorem 12. Because our utility mappings must satisfy 
Axioms A3 and A4 or Axioms A3’ and A4, we are not dealing with all of 
C”(Q, R”). We have 
G= (xl,. 
( 
..x”)E(R~)~ xx’= Q , 
I I 1 
for some a E R: . So (x’, . . . , xp- ’ ) give a good coordinate system for Q. Let 
C;(Q, Rp) be the subset of Cm(S2, Rp) consisting of mapsf = cfi , . . . ,fp) : Q + 
RP such that 
fi(X’, . . . ) xp- 1) = 3,(x’), . . . ,f,_ &cl, . . . , xp- ‘) = 3p- 1(xP- 1)) 
and 
&(x1, . . .) 9-l) = 3p(a-x’- . . - -xp- ‘) = fp(x’ + . . . +xp- I), 
for some C” maps 3,) . . . , r,,_fp : R” + R. In fact, there is a natural bijection 
between C,“(sZ, RP) and C”(R”, R) x . . . (p-times) . . . x C”(R’, R). 
Since our utility mappings must satisfy Axiom A4, we will use %’ to denote the 
open subset of [Cm(RC, R)IP of (6 1, . . . , fip) such that Dfii is never zero. Since 
DE, is never zero and since transversality arguments are always local, we can 
assume without loss of generality that 6,(x,, . . . , xc) = xl. By Theorem 1, 
x=(xl,...,xP-1) in D is in S’(u) if and only if there exist non-zero real 
numbers I 1, . . ., Ap_l suchthat 
(9 Dui(xi) = liDup(xl+ . . . +xp-I). 
This is equivalent to 
(**I 
aui 
s(x’) = 0 fori= 1,. ..,p-1 and j= 2 ,..., c. 
j 
Theorem 13. Let C,“(G!, Rp) be the space of C” utility mappings Sz + RP that 
satisfy the Axioms A,. For u in C,“(sZ, Rp), let S’(u) and O(u) denote the singu- 
larity sets defined in section 4. For an open, dense set of utility mappings u, S’(u) 
and t?(u) are (p - I)-dimensional submanifolds of 0 (possibly empty). 
Proof. We will sketch two (different) approaches to Theorem 13. First, since 
the H1, . . ., Up vary independently in Cm(RC, R), the equations (**) are (p- 1) 
(c- 1) independent equations for generic (6 1, . . . , tip) in (C”O(R”, R))p. Thus, for 
an open and dense set of (fi 1, . . . , iip), (**) define a submanifold S’(u) of 0 with 
codimension (p - l)(c - l), i.e., dimension c(p - 1) -(p - l)(c - 1) = p - 1. 
322 C.P. Simon and C. Titus, Optima in Pareto economic systems 
More formally, the equations (**) define a closed submanifold Y of J’(R”, 
R)x . . . (p- 1 times) . . . xJ’(RC, R). For each @r, . . . , i$,_. 1) in [Cm(Re, 
R)Ip- ‘, the mapping j’U : 52 + [J’(RC, R)]+l by 
(xl, . . ., x”-‘) + o”Ul(X’>, . . .,j’ii,_ l(xP- 1)) 
is generically transverse to Y by a proof analogous to that of Theorem 12. 
S’(u) is G’U)- ’ 9. 
Alternatively, one can work with C$(!I& RP) and with J&Z?, RP), the space of 
l-jets of such mappings. For example, if u = (ur , . . . , up) is in C;(O, RP), 
r Dii,(x’) 0 0 
0 DU&*) : : : 0 
Da(x) = * 0 DE,_ l(~p- ‘) , 
. 
. -Diip(xP) - Di&(xp) - DO,(xP) 
So, elements in Ji(sL, Rp) would be of the form 
((x,Y,A)I~EW-% A = 
where the A i are arbitrary 1 x c matrices}. Let d be the set of all such matrices. 
Let C, denote all l-jets for which Da(x) has corank one. So .Zs is the codimension 
q-p-c+ 1 submanifold of J,‘(Q, Rp) corresponding to those matrices A in &, 
for which there exist non-zero constants A,, . . . , A,_ 1 with A i = A,A,. Now, 
replace C, 9’r and J’(M, Rp) by &, d, and J,‘(Q, RP) in the statement and 
proof of Theorem 12 to obtain Theorem 13. 
Since 0(u) is open and closed in S’(U), it is generically a (p- I)-dimensional 
submanifold of 52, also. Q.E.D. 
Theorem 14. Let C,“(s2, RP) be as above. For utility mapping u in C~(s2, RP), 
let DGN(u) denote those x in S’(u) for which the second intrinsic derivative is 
degenerate. For generic u in CT(s2, RP), DGN(u) is an ‘algebraic-like’ subset of Sz 
of dimension p - 2, if non-empty. Thus, for P = 2, DGN(u) is generically a finite 
set ofpoints, none of which are economic optima. 
Remark. Recall that DGN(u) is the critical set of u 1 S’(u). Also, an algebraic 
set of codimension d of a manifold is a set defined as the zeroes of d independent 
real-valued polynomials. We call a set ‘algebraic-like’ if it is the inverse image of 
an algebraic set under a smooth map that is transverse to the algebraic set. 
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Proof. Again, let u = (ul, . . . , up) be a utility mapping and let U 1, . . . , Up 
denote the corresponding maps R” --f R with non-zero differential. Again, choose 
coordinates so that GP(x 1, . . . , xc) = x1 . Let ~j : R’ + R be aEi i/ax:, for 
i = 1,. . .,p-1 andj = 2,. . . c. So P(u) is defined by all U$ = 0. To make our 
computations simpler and our notation less cumbersome, we will use the 
calculus k-forms and their wedge-product; see Spivak (1965). In particular, k 
covectors pl, . . . , fik are linearly independent if and only if the k-form B1 A 
. . . A fik is non-zero. 
We will keep zi, fixed as above and work in [Cm(RC, R)Ip- ‘. Let S’ “(a) denote 
the set of points x in Q such that 
(a) c&xi) = 0 for i=l,. ..,p-1 and j= 2 ,..., c; 
(+) 
(b) dl,(x’) A . . . A dU,_,(xP- ‘) A fi dc#x’) = 0. 
Since 
(+) is equivalent to 
(a) fX$(xi) = 0 fori = 1,. ..,p-1 and j= 2 ,..., c; 
(+ +) 
(b’) dx; A . . . A dxg- ’ A A da$(x’) = 0. 
&i 
Note that (b’) involves a form of degree c(p - 1) on a c(p - I)-dimensional space. 
Equations (+ +) are (p- l)(c- l)+ 1 polynomial equations in the jet space 
[J’(R’, R)]“- ’ and so they define a (p - l)(c- 1) + 1 codimensional algebraic 
subset Z ’ I ’ of [J’(R’, R)IP- ‘. Now, define for ZJ E CF(sZ, RP), 
j2u : 52 --f [J2(Rc, R)]‘- ’ 
by 
(xl, . . . , xp- ‘) w (j2Q1(x1), . . ., j2Up_ l(xp- ‘)). 
Again, using the techniques of Theorem 12, one sees that for an open and dense 
set of u in CF(s2, Rp), j2(u) is transverse to Zisl and so, S’ ,‘(u) = j2(u)-l(Z1 9’) 
is generically a codimension (p - l)(c- 1) + 1 dimensional algebraic-like subset 
OfO. 
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To see that, in such cases, S”‘(U) is DGN(u), note that if x $ S1 *l(u), either 
(a) or (b’) of (+ +) does not hold. If (a) does not hold at x, then u has maximal 
rank at x, i.e., x $ S(u). If (b’) does not hold at x, but (a) does, then all 
but 
M5(Xi) = 0, 
A d&x’) + 0. 
i,i 
So, the equations a!(~‘) = 0 are independent and S’(u) is a manifold near x. In 
addition, the tangent space to S’(u), defined by 
d&x’) = 0 for i=l,. ..,p-1 and j=2 ,..., c, 
and the kernel of Du, defined by 
dx’, = 0 for i = 1,. . .,p-1, 
are transverse. So, u 1 S’(U) is of maximal rank at x and thus x # DGN(u). 
Remark I. The simplication fiP(x) = xl was actually only used to describe 
analytically the singular manifolds in our jet spaces. The proofs of the last two 
theorems can be written without this simplification, but the computations become 
unwieldly very quickly. Also, note that we exhibited generic properties for 
[C”(R”, R)Ip-’ with up hxed. The required properties are generic in [C”(R”, 
R)Ip, a fortiori. 
Remark 2. To see that for p = 2, the elements in S1 ‘l(u) are not TO’s, one 
uses the Whitney normal form for generic elements in S1 *I(U), when u : Q + R2. 
If 0 is the generic element in S”‘(U), then there are coordinates (yl , . . . , y,), in 
which 
u 2 = j3 +Y?+Y~Y~ +Y%. 
Note that on the path yi = 0, i =I= 2, ul is constant and u2 is strictly increasing 
at 0. So the point 0 E S1 “(u) is not a TO. See Wan (1973). 
Remark 3. If one uses the more general Axioms A’, instead of the Axioms 
A,, Theorems 13 and 14 are much easier to prove. Let C$‘(52, Rp) be the space 
of utility mappings that satisfy Axioms A;. [So, Du(x) always has rank 2 p - 1 
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and Dui(x) is never zero.] Then, C;(Q, RP) is an open subset of C”(Q R”). 
Since S’(U) is generically a submanifold of 0 of dimension p - 1 and S’ *l(u) is 
generically a submanifold of Q of dimension p-2 in C”(s2, Rp) [see Levine 
(1970) or Golubitsky-Guillemin (1974, section 4)], the same is true in Cg(sZ, Rp). 
8. Accessibility of economic optima 
After we have studied and characterized our economic optima, the following 
question arises naturally: given a Pareto economic system (i.e., a utility mapping 
u : 52 + Rp satisfying the Axioms AZ or A;) and an initial distribution of 
commodities, does there always exist a trade curve to an LPO or a TO ? At first 
thought, the answer seems to be ‘yes’; since if one is not at a TO, then one can 
trade some more and keep moving ‘closer’ to a TO. In fact, this is probably the 
case for all systems with two commodities and two agents. However, we will now 
describe a couple of interesting examples of Pareto systems with two persons and 
three commodities. In both models, the set of economic optima lie on a set of 
very small measure. In the first, no one can reach a TO from any initial state unless 
this initial state is already a TO, although one can approach arbitrarily close to a 
TO. In the second example, one cannot even get near a TO from most initial 
states. 
Example I. Since we are working with c = 3 andp = 2, Q is the Edgeworth 
cube, 
f&Y, z) (0 I x S a,, 0 I x I a2, 0 5 x 5 a3}, 
for some (al, a,, as) E R: . 
To simplify our notations and constructions, we will take 52 to 
{(X&Z)\ -2 I x 52, -2 I y I2, 0 I z 54). 
We will take ii,@, y, z) = z, i.e., ul(x, y, z) = 4-z. So the first person is in- 
different to the first two commodities and his indifference sets are planes parallel 
to the x, y-plane. Of course, u2 is a bit more intricate. 
We first describe the graphs of some auxiliary functions R’ + R’. Let fi : 





fr(x)f[O,l] forall xE[-2,2], 
fi(x) =0 ifandonlyif XE[-+,+I, 
f;(x) < 0 for xE(-2, -3); 
f;(x) > 0 for x o (3,2), 
fi(X) = fi(_X). 
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fi(x) E [0, l] for all x E [ - 2,2], 
f&) 2 fi(x) 2 0 for all x, 
f.j <f; < 0 for xE(-2, -3); 
O<f[-cf; for xE(*,2), 
(2d) fL-4 = fi(--4. 





fib> 5 f dx) I f2(x> for all 4 
f; < 0 on (-2, +)>; 
f; > 0 on 6 21, 
the graph off3 oscillates infinitely often between the graphs off1 and 
fi bothforx < -+andx > 3, 
f3 is not symmetric; in fact, let (ti} and (sJ be sequences such that: 
-2 < I, < tz < t, < . . . < -$; 
2 > s1 > s2 > sg > . . . > f; 
t E (-2, -3) is a local max. offs (f3(t) = fi(t)) if and only if I = ti 
for some i; 
s E (+,2) is a local max. off3 if and only ifs = si for some i; 
--tl>s,>-t,>Sz>..., and therefore (by the symmetry of 
f*)f3(t,) ‘f&l) ‘f&Z) ‘f&2) ’ * * ** 
So, fi , fi and f3 are P-flat at x = +3. The graphs of the functions are pictured 
in fig. 9. 
Now disregard fi and fi and work with f3. We use f3 to construct the graph 
of a C” function f4 : R2 + R’ as follows : 
Fig. 9 
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Revolve the graph of f3 around the z-axis 180”, at the same time bending it 
slightly SO that after the half-turn, (ti,fs(ti)) matches UP with (Si,fs(Si)), 
gradf,(x, z) 9 0 for all 1(x, z)I > 3, 
gradf,(x, z) = 0 for all 1(.x, z)( < 3, 
graphf, n [x, z plane] = graph f, . 
So, there is a spiraling smooth curve y on the graph off4 with the properties : 
$) 
(si, .f3(s 3) E Y and (t i, .fdt 3) E Y for all i, 
if Q is any plane containing the z-axis and p E Q n y, then p is a 
local max. on the graph off, n (2, 
(c) y is never horizontal, 
(d) y spirals in toward the circle [(x, y)l = 3, z = 0. 
A candidate forf4 : R2 -+ R would be the function 
We are now ready to construct our second utility function u2. Recall that 
8 = [ - 2,2] x [ - 2,2] x [0,4] and ZJ 1(x, y, z) = 4 -z. Let C be the solid cylinder 
((x, y, z) ( 1(x, y)l I +} in s2. Construct u2 so that u; l(2) n Sz is the graph of 
f4+2, G1 (a) n C lies in z = a, for all a, U; ‘(a) is basically the graph of f4 + a, 
but squeezed into the ‘box’ a I z I f&u), where f5 : [0, 41 + R is C” strictly 
increasing with f5(2) = 3 and f5(0) = 0. So, u; '(0) lies in z = 0. 
A candidate for u2 : R3 + R will be the function 
where F is as above. 
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Since grad ur(x, y, z) = (0, 0, - 1) and since grad z&, y, z) is vertical only 
on C and on z = 0, the set of TO’s, LPO’s and PO’s is exactly C u {z = 01. [It 
is easy to see that there are no optima on s2 n (z = 4}\C; and that there are no 
optima on the four ‘vertical’ boundary planes of D since grad u1 always points 
into 52 on these planes.] 
Furthermore, because of the oscillatory behavior of the level surfaces of u2, 
the only possible trade curves spiral in toward C. For, if one could trade toward 
C without spiralling around C, then one could trade toward C while remaining 
on some plane Q containing the z-axis. Because of ul, the z-coordinate cannot 
increase along a trade curve. But because the level surfaces of uz on Q hati 
infinitely many local minima with respect to z, once cannot reach C while staying 
on Q. 
On the other hand, these spiralling trade curves approach C asymptotically 
but they never reach C and they do not approach any one optimal position on C 
since the limit set of any trade curve contains at least a circle on C. Thus, in this 
model, one cannot reach an economic optimum unless one starts at one. 
Example 2. We will now modify Example 1 so that from most initial positions 
one cannot even get near to a TO. Let Sz and u1 be as in Example 1. Letf, , fi , 
andf, be as above but modified only in [ -3, $1 so that ifj3 is the newfs : 
and 
T&X) = 0 if and only if x = -4, 0, or 3, 
j;(x) > 0 for x E (-3, 3). 
Again rotatej, about the z-axis to obtainTb : R* + R. A candidate forJk now is 
Construct the new uz from F as before and let u = (ul, Q). Sl(u) = {z = O> u 
K' u z-axis; and all the TO’s now lie on z = 0 or on the z-axis. The TO’s on the 
z-axis are accessible by trade curves from any position in C. However, if one 
starts in sZ\C, again the only possible trade curves are spirals that are asymp- 
totic to X, the boundary of C. However, aC acts as a barrier, preventing one 
from getting near the TO’s on the z-axis. 
Remark. One can easily obtain the phenomena of Examples 1 and 2 with 6, 
and 2, obeying the strong monotonicity conditions that are usually assumed in 
economic models. 
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Remark. We can use these examples to give an example of a state that is a 
TO but not a TO+ as promised in section 5. Construct u2 as in Example 1 but 
with the cylinder C replaced by the line L : x = 0, y = 0. Let 0, be the negative 
of this new u2 and let 0 1 be the negative of the above ul. So, if in this model the 
initial state lies on L, one can trade from L only by spiralling away from it, i.e., 
every smooth trade curve y : [0, E) + Q with y(0) EL has y’(0) = 0. Thus, the 
points of L are in TO+ but not in TO. 
Fig. 11. Graph of x. 
We had to work a bit to construct u2 in Examples 1 and 2. It was essential in 
both examples that u2 was C”-flat on X’. Thus, the following conjectures seem 
natural : 
Conjecture 1. For a generic set of utility mappings u = (ul, . . . , up) in 
Cz(G, Rp), one can reach a TO from any initial distribution of commodities by 
trading along trade curves. 
Conjecture 2. If G 1, . . . , ii p : Sz + R are all real-analytic functions, then one 
can reach a TO from any initial distribution of commodities by trading along 
trade curves. 
Smale (1973a, 1974b) and Wan (1973) are concerned with this conjecture for 
the case where D is a compact manifold without boundary. In fact, Wan proves 
the conjecture in this case for p = 2. However, a real difficulty arises when trade 
curves are forced to the boundary of the usual commodity space S2 - a problem 
which has received very little attention in the literature and which we hope to 
deal with in a future paper. This problem cannot be avoided for it is simple to 
construct a model of a Pareto system in the Edgeworth Box (p = c = 2), where 
both u1 and u2 are strongly convex and monotone yet S’(u) = 4 and all the 
TO’s lie on aS2. 
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